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Анотацiя. У цiй статтi обговорюється спроба Кейта Френкiша нейтралiзу-
вати аргумент зомбi проти матерiалiзму, протиставивши йому аналогiчний
аргумент на користь фiзикалiзму – аргумент антизомбi; розвивається вiд-
повiдь, яку дав аргументам цього роду Девiд Чалмерс. На пiдтримку дум-
ки Чалмерса, що збагненнiсть ситуацiй, подiбних до iснування антизомбi, є
проблематичною, запропоновано аналiз, який показує, чому iдея антизом-
бi є, ймовiрно, некогерентною. Доведено, що для вiдхилення цього аналiзу,
матерiалiст мусить заперечувати вiдсутнiсть апрiорного випливання фено-
менального з фiзичного; проте це означає заперечення збагненностi зомбi,
що робить аргумент антизомбi непотрiбним.
Ключовi слова: антизомбi, когерентнiсть, збагненнiсть, феноменальний
зомбi, фiзикалiзм.
Abstract. In this article, I discuss Keith Frankish’s attempt to neutralize
the zombie argument against materialism with a closely parallel argument for
physicalism, the anti-zombie argument, and develop David Chalmers’ reply to
this species of arguments. I support Chalmers’ claim that the conceivability of
situations like the existence of an anti-zombie is problematic with an analysis
that makes it plausible that the idea of an anti-zombie is incoherent, and argue
that to counter this, a materialist should deny the absence of a priori entai-
lment from the physical to the phenomenal; however, this would involve the
denial of the conceivability of zombies and so make the anti-zombie argument
superfluous.
Keywords: anti-zombie, coherence, conceivability, phenomenal zombie, physi-
calism.
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Keith Frankish’s anti-zombie argument is one of the most interesting
attempts at a rebuttal of the zombie argument, which «in recent years
. . . has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views
of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has
received from David Chalmers»1. It is representative of the series of similar
arguments advanced by Marton2, Sturgeon3, Brown4, and others, so that
the brunt of the following discussion bears on these arguments too.
The zombie argument, as construed by Chalmers, proceeds from
the conceivability of exact physical duplicates of human beings without
phenomenal mental states (phenomenal zombies) to their metaphysical
possibility, and from this to the falsity of physicalism. Frankish counters
this with an apparently closely parallel argument to the opposite, and
argues that this efficiently neutralizes the zombie argument, so that the
result is «a stand-off». Chalmers replied that this is not the case, because
the decisive premise of the zombie argument is obviously true, whereas the
«parallel» premise of the anti-zombie argument is not5. It is obvious that
phenomenal zombies are conceivable; it is not obvious that anti-zombies
are. However, this reply is likely to need more defense than Chalmers
provides. Anti-zombies are likely to seem conceivable for materialists (I
suppose that Frankish, when advancing the argument, did really believe
that anti-zombies are conceivable). If so, something more is required on
the side of defenders of the zombie argument. In this article, I propose the
explanation and defense of Chalmers’ point that serves this purpose.
To begin with, let us rehash and compare the two opposing arguments.
The zombie argument is an argument about imaginary creatures called
«phenomenal zombies», which are arguably metaphysically possible, and
their metaphysical possibility means that physicalism is false. Phenomenal
zombies are exact — atom-to-atom (or quark-to-quark, if you like), with
all the structure and dynamics — physical copies of human beings but
with no mental (phenomenal, subjective) states. There are all the same
physical interactions and movements of cells, molecules, atoms, etc. inside
1Frankish K. The anti-zombie argument // Philosophical Quarterly. — 2007. —
Vol. 57. — P. 651.
2Marton P. Zombies versus materialists: The battle for conceivability // Southwest
Philosophy Review. — 1998. —Vol. 14. — P. 131-138.
3Sturgeon S. Matters of Mind: Conscious, Reason, and Nature. — London :
Routledge, 2000.
4Brown R. Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism // Journal
of Consciousness Studies. — 2010. —Vol. 17. — P. 47-69.
5Chalmers D. The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism // Chalmers D.
The Character of Consciousness. — New York : Oxford University Press, 2010. — P. 180.
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and all the same movements of legs, arms, fingers, lips, tongues, eyelids,
etc. outside; however, there are no subjective experiences and no mental
subjects-experiencers; there is nothing it is like to be a zombie. The zombie
argument, as construed by Chalmers6, proceeds from the thesis that zombi-
es are conceivable to the thesis that they are metaphysically possible and
from this to the conclusion that physicalism is false.
Frankish’s anti-zombie argument is an argument about imaginary
creatures called «anti-zombies», such that their metaphysical possibility
means that physicalism is true. Anti-zombies are exact — atom-to-atom
(or quark-to-quark, if you like), with all the structure and dynamics —
physical copies of human beings, with all human experiences but without
any nonphysical states. There are all the same physical interactions and
movements and all the same subjective experiences, and there is somethi-
ng it is like to be an anti-zombie; however, there is nothing nonphysical.
The anti-zombie argument proceeds from the thesis that anti-zombies are
conceivable to the thesis that they are metaphysically possible and from
this to the conclusion that physicalism is true.
It seems that Chalmers’ zombie argument and Frankish’s anti-zombie
argument are exactly parallel. Now, if the zombie argument, taken
separately, has a considerable force, then the anti-zombie argument should
have the same force in the opposite direction. Thus, the resultant force
of the two arguments taken together is zero; the zombie argument is
efficiently neutralized by the anti-zombie argument.
To understand the situation better, it is helpful to consider the
common logical structure of the arguments. The structure involves two
subarguments — let us call them «modal» (conceivability-to-possibility)
and «substantial».
The modal (conceivability-to-possibility) subargument has a form:
(M1) X is conceivable.
(M2) Conceivability entails metaphysical possibility.
Therefore,
(S1) X is metaphysically possible.
6See: Chalmers D. Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? // Conceivability and
Possibility / ed. T.Gendler and J.Hawthorne. —New York : Oxford University Press,
2002. — Р. 145-200; Chalmers D. The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
// Chalmers D. The Character of Consciousness. — New York : Oxford University Press,
2010. — P. 141-205.
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(In the case of the zombie argument, X is a phenomenal zombie; in the
case of the anti-zombie argument, X is an anti-zombie.)
The substantial subargument has a form:
(S2) If X is metaphysically possible, then physicalism is false/true.
(S1) X is metaphysically possible.
Therefore,
(C) Physicalism is false/true.
(In the case of the zombie argument, (S2) and (C) attribute to physi-
calism the value «false»; in the case of the anti-zombie argument, «true».)
The two subarguments constitute one argument, because the conclusion
of the modal subargument (S1) is used as a premise in the substantial
subargument.
Now, the initial premises of the zombie and anti-zombie arguments are
(M1), (M2), and (S2). Of these, (M2) is shared and thus uncontroversi-
al. (S2) is uncontroversial, too: both sides of the discussion agree that
the metaphysical possibility of a phenomenal zombie entails the falsity of
physicalism, whereas the metaphysical possibility of an anti-zombie entai-
ls its truth. The sides disagree only about which one — a zombie or an
anti-zombie — is metaphysically possible. And this, as far as Chalmers’
and Frankish’s arguments go, is taken to be derived from the conceivabi-
lity premise (M1). Thus, only (M1) is a controversial point of difference
between the two arguments. We have two its opposing versions:
(M1z) A phenomenal zombie is conceivable.
(M1az) An anti-zombie is conceivable.
For the anti-zombie argument to neutralize the zombie argument,
these two claims should be on equal footing? Are they? Chalmers suggests
that they are not, because it is not obvious that the truth of materialism
is conceivable, in the sense stronger than prima facie conceivability (=
it is not obvious that anti-zombies are conceivable): many people find
it inconceivable that consciousness is a physical process; although this
inconceivability is not «so obvious that it should be used as a premise
in an argument against materialism», the conceivability is not either7.
7Chalmers D. The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism. — P. 180.
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Of course, this saves the zombie argument only if zombies are better off,
that is, only if it is obvious that zombies are conceivable. So, Chalmers’
response in a nutshell is that it is obvious that a zombie is conceivable,
while it is not obvious that consciousness being a physical process (and
so, an anti-zombie) is conceivable.
To estimate this response, we need to elucidate what is involved in the
claim that something is conceivable, in the sense relevant to the zombie
argument. There are some difficulties in this, because Chalmers’ treatment
of conceivability and possibility in the zombie argument had undergone a
revision in the period between 1996 and 2002, without (as far as I know)
his making an explicit statement of this revision. Let us pay attention to
this revision-involving development.
First, consider the initial Chalmers’ exposition of the zombie argument,
in The Conscious Mind. Four important points should be noted about that
exposition.
(1) Chalmers argued that the kind of possibility relevant for his
argument is logical possibility — there being no incoherence in the descri-
ption of zombies, as distinct from natural (nomological, causal) possibility,
what is possible given the laws of nature of the actual world. Natural possi-
bility is irrelevant because it may be that zombies are naturally impossible
and materialism is false (if some laws of nature make it the case that some
physical events in the brain cause, or produce, non-physical mental states).
However, if the notion of zombies were incoherent (a world of zombies is
logically impossible, whatever the laws of nature), this would mean that
materialism is true; and if it is coherent, it seems that materialism should
be false. Accordingly, Chalmers talks of «logical supervenience», which is
a matter of logical necessity8.
(2) Chalmers also discussed the proposition that the relevant kind of
possibility can be what philosophers usually call «metaphysical possibili-
ty», and argued for modal monism — the claim that metaphysical possibili-
ty should be identified with logical possibility (perhaps, described in terms
that accommodate Kripkean «a posteriori semantic twist»9 by referring
according to their secondary intensions).
(3) In the section «The possibility of zombies» Chalmers defended
this possibility by straightforward appeal to obviousness rather than by
8Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind. —New York : Oxford University Press, 1996. —
P. 34-38.
9Ibid. — P. 38.
Dmytro Sepetyi 23
inference from conceivability. First, he suggested that it is obvious that
zombies are logically possible, that is, that there is no contradiction in the
description of a zombie. Second, he proposed some «indirect arguments . . .
in order to establish that the obvious logical possibility really is a logical
possibility, and really is obvious»10.
(4) However, in an earlier fragment, Chalmers made an attempt to
«spell out the relationships among logical necessity, conceptual truth, and
conceivability»11. In particular, he suggested that «there seems to be no
reason to deny that conceivability of a world implies possibility»12, and
supported this suggestion by considering traditional (Kripkean) purported
counter-examples and showing that they can be declined by means of the
two-dimensional analysis13. On this ground, Chalmers «henceforth take
this for granted as a claim about logical possibility; any variety of possi-
bility for which conceivability does not imply possibility will then be a
narrower class»14. A few pages later, he proposed «using conceivability as
a test for logical possibility»15.
(4) can be seen as a precursor of his later construal that explicitly
makes the conceivability-to-possibility entailment part of the foundation of
the zombie argument. However, it is important that on this later construal,
the kind of possibility that is (supposedly) entailed by conceivability is not
logical but metaphysical possibility.
One can wonder if there is a difference between the claim that concei-
vability entails logical possibility and the claim that conceivability entails
metaphysical possibility, given modal monism. However, there is a di-
fference, because in Chalmers’ later expositions of the zombie argument,
modal monism is not «given» or argued for before the argument for
the conceivability-to-possibility entailment but rather results from this
argument.
In between 1996 and 2002, Chalmers explained that in his usage,
«conceivability» and «logical possibility» are «tied by stipulation»; so that
on this stipulation, «any variety of possibility for which conceivability does
not imply possibility will then be a narrower class»16. Such an explanation
10Ibid. — P. 96-97.
11Ibid. — P. 65.
12Ibid. — P. 68.
13Ibid. — P. 67-68.
14Ibid. — P. 68.
15Ibid. — P. 73.
16Chalmers D. Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality // Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research. — 1999. —Vol. 59. — P. 477-8.
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should be puzzling, because it makes nonsense of the use of conceivability
as a test for logical possibility. (Accordingly, there is no sense to argue for
the entailment from conceivability to logical possibility, if that entailment
is a matter of stipulation.) This was corrected in Chalmers’ later expositi-
ons of the zombie argument. In the corrected version, the stipulative link
between conceivability and logical possibility is retained by defining (ideal
negative) conceivability as the absence of a priori contradiction17, and the
proposition to use conceivability as a test for logical possibility is replaced
with the argument for the claim that conceivability entails metaphysical
possibility. This makes conceivability nearly synonymic with logical possi-
bility, and makes the argument for the conceivability-entails-metaphysical-
possibility claim tantamount to the argument for modal monism.
What is important here is that conceivability, in this objective sense,
means the absence of a priori contradiction. Chalmers’ reply to arguments
like that of Frankish should be understood in this sense: it is obvious that
there is no a priori contradiction in the notion of a phenomenal zombie;
however, it is not obvious that there is no a priori contradiction in such
notions as that of Frankish’s anti-zombie.
However, a materialist like Frankish can challenge this claim by stating
that for him, the notion of an anti-zombie seems coherent, and it is not for
him more obvious that the notion of a zombie is coherent than that the
notion of an anti-zombie is coherent. Can a zombist efficiently defend his
point in face of this objection? I think that she can do it, by proposing a
plausible explanation of where the incoherence may lie in the notion of an
anti-zombie, and pointing out that there is no such a plausible explanation
as to where the incoherence may lie in the notion of a zombie.
Basically, it is the general point made by Chalmers in The Conscious
Mind :
In general, a certain burden of proof lies on those who claim that a given
description is logically impossible. . . . If no reasonable analysis of the terms
in question points toward a contradiction, or even makes the existence of
a contradiction plausible, then there is a natural assumption in favor of
logical possibility18.
17There is some complication, because Chalmers developed also the concept of posi-
tive conceivability and proposed two versions of the zombie argument, with negative
conceivability and with positive conceivability. We can limit our discussion to the case
of negative conceivability, because positive conceivability is a stronger notion — it is
defined as the absence of a priori contradiction (that is, negative conceivability) plus
detailed imaginability. If so, then if (as I will argue) an anti-zombie is not negatively
conceivable, then it is not positively conceivable either.
18Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind. — P. 96.
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For an anti-zombie, a reasonable analysis that points toward a contradi-
ction in the notion (makes the existence of such a contradiction plausible)
can easily be provided. Here, we begin with the notion of a purely physi-
cal copy of a human being — a creature that has all physical properties
of a human being and has no other — nonphysical — properties. So far, all
there is to this creature are physical properties, their bearers (having no
other properties), such as atoms, arranged in complex spatial structures,
and their physical interactions and movements; all these involve nothing
subjective. Apparently, there are no subjective experiences in the picture.
Then we attribute subjective experiences to this creature. It is at least
very plausible that thereby we add to the initial notion (that of a purely
physical copy of a human being) something that initially was not there
(subjective experiences) and thereby we destroy this notion, since it forbi-
ds such additions. We can express this by the following simple formula:
a purely physical copy of a human being + subjective experiences 6=
a purely physical copy of a human being.
With the addition of subjective experiences, a purely physical copy of
a human being ceases to be purely physical. The result of the addition is
something that has other — nonphysical — properties. Thus, the idea of an
anti-zombie (as a purely physical copy of a human being that has subjective
experiences) is incoherent. That is, anti-zombies are inconceivable19.
How can a physicalist (including functionalist) oppose this analysis?
It would not do to oppose it with the claim that subjective experiences
are identical with some brain states (or some functions realized by such
states), and so if the latter are given, the former are there as well. Given the
explanatory gap between the physical and the subjective (phenomenal), or
19The same case can be made in terms of supervenience. It is plausible that Frankish’s
description of the anti-zombie world as a world in which «consciousness is a physical
phenomenon, supervening metaphysically on the world’s microphysical features — in
virtue of token identities, say» (Frankish K. The anti-zombie argument. — P. 654) is
incoherent. If modal monism is accepted (and Frankish does not challenge it), then the
metaphysical supervenience is a matter of a priori necessity or entailment. A metaphysi-
cally (logically) supervenes upon B if and only if B entails A as a matter of conceptual
relationship between A and B. However, it seems clear that there is no such entailment
from any possible fundamental (micro)physical facts to phenomenal facts. Whatever
are the details of possible arrangements and dynamics of fundamental (micro)physical
entities (on the assumption that such entities are not capable of having experiences,
that there is nothing it is like to be a quark or a lepton), it seems clear that these would
not entail there being mental subjects with their subjective experiences. If so (which is
plausible, at least), then the idea that consciousness metaphysically supervenes on the
physical is incoherent.
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the hard problem of consciousness, the analysis provided is a reasonable
analysis that points toward a contradiction in the notion (makes the exi-
stence of such a contradiction plausible). And that is all that is required
of it.
Can this analysis be neutralized with a counter-analysis — a reasonable
analysis that points toward a contradiction in the notion of a phenomenal
zombie (makes the existence of such a contradiction plausible)? If we
recognize that there is the explanatory gap from the physical to the
phenomenal, and the hard problem of consciousness, we should also
recognize that such a counter-analysis is impossible20.
The decisive consideration here is the one to which Chalmers appealed
in his formulation of the hard problem:
The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any
physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process
could exist without experience. Experience . . . is not entailed by the physi-
cal21.
Let us designate this claim as No Physical-to-Phenomenal Entailment,
NPPE.
If NPPE is admitted, then there is «a reasonable analysis of the terms in
question» that «points toward a contradiction, or even makes the existence
of a contradiction plausible» for the case of an anti-zombie, and there is no
such analysis for the case of a phenomenal zombie. Hence, the anti-zombie
argument is impotent against the zombie argument.
On the other hand, if NPPE is denied, then the anti-zombie argument
is just a red herring, because the denial of NPPE is tantamount to the
denial of the conceivability of a phenomenal zombie (as well as the denial
of there being the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness).
It is no news at all (and does not require the idea of an anti-zombie to
see) that one would hold that a phenomenal zombie is conceivable, only
if one recognizes that there is the explanatory gap and the hard problem
of consciousness. And, as I have argued above, those who recognize this
should recognize also that a phenomenal zombie is conceivable whereas an
20There is a prima facie plausible analysis of how the idea of a phenomenal zombie
can be incoherent that is open for an interactionist dualist but not for a materialist.
If in the actual world, interactionist dualism is true, that is, immaterial consciousness
causally contributes to the physical processes in the human brain, then a zombie would
lack that causal factor, and the idea that in this case all physical processes could be
just as with human beings seems prima facie incoherent.
21Chalmers D. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness // Journal of Consci-
ousness Studies. — 1995. —Vol. 2. — P. 208.
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anti-zombie is not. Some of them can still disagree with Chalmers that
conceivability entails metaphysical possibility, but that is another story.
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